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Overview
We propose a set of guidelines for a Sustainable Development 
Mechanism (SDM), a new market-based mechanism under 
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. We propose that a new 
SDM should adopt a sectoral approach for facilitating the 
international transfer of mitigation outcomes. We suggest ways 
in which a new sectoral SDM can create a robust, credible 
market for tradeable carbon offsets, building upon the lessons 
of the project-based Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)  
and active sectoral-based crediting mechanisms in several 
domestic contexts.1
 
LessOns frOm the CDm experienCe
The CDM provides nearly a decade of experience with global 
governance of carbon offsets. It is imperative to capitalize on this 
experience in creating a post-2020 carbon offset mechanism. 
There are several factors that will influence the success of a 
future carbon offset mechanism that achieves the mitigation and 
sustainable development objectives of the Paris Agreement, most 
importantly, transparency, governance, and accounting. 
Governance of the CDM was coordinated by the CDM Executive 
Board (EB) with support from participating countries’ Designated 
National Authorities (DNAs) and accredited independent 
auditors, Designated Operational Entities (DOEs). The oversight 
provided by the CDM EB has largely been seen as successful. 
The national governance functions of the DNAs, on the other 
hand, has been gradually eroded2 and has allowed for gaming of 
the system, wherein DNAs have been given undue authority in 
setting criteria for additionality and project selection.3   
The environmental integrity of the CDM rests on the additionality 
of approved credits. There is now a wide range of evidence 
that suggests the additionality of CDM projects was severely 
limited4,5 and potentially constrained by the project-based nature 
of the CDM’s additionality review.6,7 Compounding matters, 
the project-based additionality review of the CDM was limited 
in its transparency while its onerous requirements significantly 
increased transaction costs.8,9 Although the CDM implemented a 
system to track transfers of certified emission reductions (CERs), 
moving forward, tracking the use of CDM credits may pose a 
threat to the environmental performance of the Paris Agreement 
if host countries and financing countries of CDM projects move 
to double-claim their past CDM activity.10 Host countries and 
financing countries of CDM projects should work quickly to resolve 
how to handle existing CDM projects with the aim to discontinue 
crediting under these projects as soon as possible.
the seCtOraL apprOaCh
In contrast to the project-based approach of the CDM, a sectoral 
approach evaluates aggregate emission reductions relative to 
a single sector-wide baseline. A sectoral approach to the SDM 
would have several benefits. First, a sectoral approach would 
allow for greater flexibility in modes of investment, as activities 
complementary to direct mitigation, such as investment in 
infrastructure and capacity building, could be supported. Second, 
a sectoral approach would expand the range of mitigation options 
available, increasing the scale of possible emissions reductions. 
Finally, a sectoral approach would lower overall transaction costs, 
as analysis of additionality would be done once at the sector level 
and specific investments would not require detailed approval based 
on project-level additionality. 
making a seCtOraL apprOaCh wOrk
Moving toward an international sectoral approach to carbon 
offsets will require confronting several significant challenges, many 
of which have not yet been encountered in experience with the 
Kyoto mechanisms. Here we present a set of proposals for how 
a sectoral SDM could be implemented in a gradual manner that 
creates opportunities for learning without significant risk to the 
environmental integrity of the Paris Agreement.
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scope:
• Host countries for SDM activity should be limited to the Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs). Explicit rules should be adopted to 
expand host-country status to other developing counties based 
on the criteria of per-capita income, investment capacity, and 
mitigation opportunity. The shift to limit CER eligibility in the EU 
ETS to only LDC host countries signifies the political importance 
of limiting host country participation to the countries where 
sustainable development co-benefits are likely to be greatest.
• Beginning implementation of the SDM with a relatively small 
number of host countries will allow for more gradual adoption 
of governance norms before host country status expands. The 
CDM experience demonstrates the perils of inappropriately 
locking in practices while moving too quickly. 
governance: 
• The CDM EB provides a useful international governance 
structure that should be maintained in governing the SDM2. 
However, participation rules for the executive board should 
be reformed to strengthen conflict of interest protection. 
Current CDM EB members should be retained to facilitate the 
transfer of key learnings from the CDM, but participation on 
the new executive board should also be expanded. A share of 
transactions under the SDM should be used to support building 
the technical capacity of the board.
• The new SDM executive board should establish an oversight 
committee to maintain transparency within the board and 
ultimately lower the possibility of gaming international carbon 
markets.
• Established CDM DNAs in host countries should be maintained 
under the SDM. This would help to lower political costs of 
transitioning to the SDM, increasing political feasibility. DNAs 
should also seek to engage domestic central banks to facilitate 
governance while maintaining national sovereignty. 
Defining sectoral baselines:
• The new SDM executive board should adopt standardized 
methodologies for setting sectoral baselines. These methods 
should be adopted by the executive board with country input 
from all Parties to the UNFCCC, but the process to determine 
methodologies should be driven from the top.
• Sectoral baselines should be defined in terms of absolute 
emissions (rather than a technology baseline or a baseline 
indexed to economic variables). Absolute emissions baselines 
guarantee a certain level of overall environmental performance 
and are less likely to depend on external conditions. 
• Baseline and crediting methods should avoid exemptions to 
provide the highest level of environmental integrity. 
emissions accounting:
• A sectoral SDM poses significant challenges for emissions 
accounting. The accounting regime that will emerge under 
the Paris Agreement will need to grapple with the challenge 
of avoiding double counting of emission reductions between 
countries financing and hosting SDM activity. One feasible 
approach would be to establish multiple baselines that avoid 
double counting host country mitigation activities under 
Nationally Determined Commitments as activity under the SDM. 
• Tracking emissions and emissions reductions credited in 
a domestic sector will require national and international 
registries of emissions and internationally transferred mitigation 
outcomes. 
reevaluation: 
•	The SDM should be established initially with clearly defined 
goals over short (approximately 5-year) timelines. The SDM 
executive board should establish regular evaluation timelines to 
allow for reflection and adjustments.
• Country-level sector baselines should be reevaluated 
regularly on the basis of emissions reductions and sustainable 
development. 
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The views expressed in this brief are the views of the authors and not the Uni-
versity of Minnesota or the Center for Science, Technology, and Environmental 
Policy. We hope to contribute to the dialogue on developing a post-2020 inter-
national climate policy architecture and welcome all comments. a full paper 
discussing the ideas in this brief will be available soon. please contact 
gabechan@umn.edu for a copy.
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